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ABSTRACT 
Since September 12, 2001, countering terrorist financing has been one of the 
many major fronts used in the war on terrorism.  Outside of monitoring communications 
through high technology, the next most important task for intelligence-gathering entities 
against terrorist organizations is to learn how they raise, store, and move money in the 
financing of their operations.  Although there are many conduits that a terrorist can 
choose from when moving money, they use Islamic charities both licitly and illicitly 
within the terrorist financial network. 
Research is still incomplete as to how Islamic charities operate, how they raise 
funding, and exactly how they accomplish their part of terrorist activity when involved.  
Determining how creditable Islamic charities avoid being compromised, and how to 
detect charities being used as false fronts by terrorists can establish a common picture to 
detect future abuses.  Once established, agencies such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Department of Justice, and international agencies such as the Financial 
Action Task Force can develop strategies around this common picture to deter terrorist 
activities within Islamic charitable organizations. 
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I. ARE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS’ ABUSES AGAINST 
ISLAMIC CHARITIES RECEIVING ENOUGH ATTENTION? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since September 12, 2001, countering terrorist financing has been one of the 
many major fronts used in the war on terrorism.  Outside of monitoring communications 
through high technology, the next most important task for intelligence gathering entities 
against terrorist organizations is to learn how they raise, store, and move money in the 
financing of their operations.1  Although there are many conduits that a terrorist can 
choose from when moving money, they use Islamic charities both licitly and illicitly 
within the terrorist financial network. 
Research is still incomplete as to how Islamic charities operate, how they raise 
funding, and exactly how they accomplish their part of terrorist activity when involved.2  
Determining how creditable Islamic charities avoid being compromised, and how to 
detect charities being used as false fronts by terrorists can establish a common picture to 
detect future abuses.  Once established, agencies such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Department of Justice, and international agencies such as the 
Financial Action Task Force, can develop strategies around this common picture to deter 
terrorist activities within Islamic charitable organizations. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Knowing how terrorists use/abuse Islamic charities within a terrorist financial 
network to raise funds may allow those same charities to avoid accepting an unwanted 
risk, and inhibiting one piece of the terrorist financial network.  Could this risk be, or has 
it been, leveraged in a way to magnifying and disrupt the terrorist financial network and 
in turn disrupt past and future attacks? 
                                                 
1 Sean S. Costigan and David Gold, Terrornomics (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2007), viiii. 
2 Jon B. Alterman and Karin Von Hippel, Understanding Islamic Charities, Vol. 29, no. 7 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), x. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Combating terrorist financing through targeting and regulating Islamic charities is 
one of five financial fronts that the United States and the international community have 
chosen to focus on since September 11, 2001.  Funding of Islamic charities through the 
zaqat creates a large pool of fungible assets to be dispersed throughout the international 
financial system and evidence exists that terrorist networks have exploited Islamic 
charities.  Specifically, investigations of Saudi charities have revealed numerous abuses 
over a long period.  Muslim diasporas have also risen in the interest of international law 
enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Financial 
Action Task Force.  A more robust strategy may be required to target charitable 
organizations to stop terrorist financing and, in turn, reduce terrorist attacks throughout 
the world. 
Combating terrorist financing has moved from a low priority prior to September 
11, 2001, to a very high priority after the attacks of that day.3  It stands number two on 
the list behind highly technical communications monitoring used by intelligence services 
to gather information against terrorist organizations.4  If we apply the analogy of how fire 
burns to terrorism, we can understand why targeting the financing of terrorism is so 
important.  Fire requires three things to sustain itself, fuel, heat, and oxygen.  Like a fire, 
terrorist organizations also require three basic elements in the form of weapons, human 
capital, and funding sources for survival.  If the logic of the analogy holds, removing or 
hindering one of the elements should provide a degree of disruption to the terrorist 
organization.  In turn, this disruption should affect the ability of the organization carry 
out attacks by its operational cells. 
Within current literature, five principal ways have surfaced through which 
terrorist’s finance their organizations: direct contributions, international donations into 
charitable foundations, state sponsorship, criminal activities, and the collection of the 
                                                 
3 Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, "The U.S. Campaign to Squeeze Terrorists' Financing," 
Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 1 (Fall 2008), 67, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1603693011&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
4 Costigan and Gold, Terrornomics, viiii. 
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zaqat.5  Of these five, international donations made to Islamic charitable foundations 
stands out as a primary concern for combating terrorism.  The zaqat is of secondary 
concern since it consists of a large pool of fungible resources and the majority of it finds 
its way into Islamic charities as well. 
This is not to be mistaken as an attempt to classify all Islamic charities as 
supporting terrorism, as this is incorrect and unfounded.  Islamic charities have been just 
as effective, and at times more so, throughout the world as many other religiously 
affiliated charities.6  They provide up to one-fifth of the world’s humanitarian effort at an 
estimated $3 billion Untied States Dollars (USD) annually.7 
In order to understand Islamic charities, we must first discuss one of its main 
pillars, the zaqat.  It is an annual tax levied on Muslims as part of the Islamic faith and 
contains two parts.  First, a calculation per person within a family unit at 2.25 kilograms, 
the number calculated equates to the amount of food a household must donate.  The 
second piece more widely accepted as the zaqat itself and based on household wealth.  
Household wealth includes the value of property, income, savings, crops, livestock, gold, 
minerals, and treasures and equates to approximately $1,300 USD per year.8   
The zaqat collected supports eight types of Muslims, those with no possessions or 
livelihood, those that cannot meet basic needs, zaqat workers, converts, those escaping 
slavery, bondage or indebtedness, stranded travelers, and those with fulfilling a strong 
cause for Allah.9  Due to the nature of the reasons for the zaqat, the funds are usually 
dispersed toward regions of strife throughout the world.  This in turn, by chance, or on 
purpose, will usually end up in the hands of terrorist.10  Terrorist organizations receive 
                                                 
5 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A 
Comparative Perspective (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 60. 
6 Alterman and Von Hippel, Understanding Islamic Charities,  6–7. 
7 Ibid., viii. 
8 Alterman and Von Hippel, Understanding Islamic Charities, 5. 
9 Costigan and Gold, Terrornomics, 53. 
10 Ibid., 53. 
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funds for a myriad of different activities other than operational efforts of attack to include 
propaganda, recruitment, and maintaining the organizational network.11 
A concern arises throughout literature about Islamic charities and the fact that 
they can easily be abused by terrorist organizations as recipients of the zaqat.  Evidence 
points out that one-third of all Islamic charities have supported terrorist organizations in 
one way or another.12  Some (fraudulent) Islamic charities are established fronts for 
terrorist organizations, and the majority of them have been detrimentally affected since 
2001 and the institution of counter terrorism financing measures throughout the Western 
world.  The Muslim World League, SAAR Foundation, and Saudi High Commission are 
all examples of terrorist organizations falsely representing charitable charters to raise 
funds for terrorists.13  Other charities have ignorantly supported terrorist organizations 
infiltrated by terrorists who act as operatives to divert money away from the legitimate 
causes of the charity. 
Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia provide an excellent case for the need to focus 
on and protect the abuse of charitable organizations from terrorist around the world.  
Saudi charities, at a minimum, do have weak ties to terrorist organizations and some 
evidence suggests that there may stronger ties to explore.14 
There are many examples of ties other than weak ones in regards to the Saudis 
and terrorist organizations.  Up until 2003, Osama bin Laden had been allowed to collect 
millions of dollars in funds from supporters in the Kingdom although the government of 
Saudi Arabia termed him a renegade and issued a (very weakly executed) warrant for his 
arrest.15  While allowed to operate freely in Saudi Arabia, he publicly called for 
charitable contributions toward Al-Qaida and other radical groups.16 
                                                 
11 Costigan and Gold, Terrornomics, 49. 
12 Alterman and Von Hippel, Understanding Islamic Charities, vi. 
13 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed – And How to Stop it (Chicago: Bonus 
Books, 2003), 38, 41–42. 
14 Alterman and Von Hippel, Understanding Islamic Charities, 76. 
15 Gerald L. Posner, Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection, 1st ed. 
(New York: Random House, 2005), 166. 
16 Ibid., 167. 
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Although Saudi charities have been part of humanitarian efforts around the globe, 
it was stated in a senate investigative commission in 2003 that “Saudi Arabia is present at 
every stage of Al-Qaeda financing, but primarily as the major source of funding.”17  The 
Saudis up through 2003 also passed protection money onto Osama bin Laden, and 
charities were the conduit in which it occurred.18  The 9/11 Commission termed Saudi 
Arabia as a “fertile [area for] fundraising groups” and implicated extreme religious 
views, charitable giving and little legal oversight as part of the problem.19  Could this line 
of thinking also be applied to diasporas throughout the world? 
In this course of research, Muslim diasporas rise to the surface as an integral part 
of the mix in relation to Islamic charities and the financing of terrorist organizations.  The 
traditional definition of diaspora is associated with a group of people both forceful 
dispersed from their homeland, as well as a maintaining deeply rooted and established 
ties back to the homeland through traditions and material exchange.20  A more 
contemporary definition includes growing ethno-national groups within a nation-state due 
to migration and the availability of new and affordable communications technology.21 
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have taken a keen interest in diasporas 
for many reasons.  Well-organized diasporas exist throughout all of North America and 
Western Europe effectively connecting isolated ethnic populations with their homelands.  
This has been magnified by globalization in recent years and allows people to “live” in 
one country, while residing in another.22  Individuals maintain financial ties and current 
knowledge of their home country’s current events, politics, and religious teachings  
 
 
                                                 
17 Gerald L. Posner, Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection, 1st ed. 
(New York: Random House, 2005), 168. 
18  Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 170. 
20 Christoph Schumann, "A Muslim 'Diaspora' in the United States?" The Muslim World 97, no. 1 
(January 2007), 12. 
21 Ibid., 13. 
22 Moisés Naím, "Missing Links: The New Diaspora," Foreign Policy, no. 131 (July –August 2002), 
96. 
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through electronic means.  The reverse has also occurred where political campaigning 
and fundraising has occurred in diasporas by candidates from the diaspora’s home 
country.23 
These population centers provide a profitable area to gather funds for the zaqat 
and Islamic charities.  Unfortunately, they also provide fertile ground for terrorist 
organizations to establish financial branches to take advantage of fundraising efforts and 
sympathetic views towards their “higher cause.”24  The majority of funds raised within 
diasporic populations are usually through legal means.  Fundraising activities within 
diasporas include collecting membership dues (voluntary or mandatory) to be a part of 
the diaspora, during parties or celebrations, and memberships within clubs internal to the 
diaspora itself.  Once again, with the above activities, we can see how dense ethnic 
populations can maintain social, cultural, and political connections to their country of 
origin.25  The funds raised through the above legal activities enter into; remain stored, 
and moved within established legal financial networks.  This then equates to ease of 
movement through the world’s financial network, and an opportunity for terrorist 
organizations takes advantage of their fungibility.26  
For the benefit of those truly in need of charitable monies for survival, the 
international community must determine how to best protect Islamic charitable 
organizations from terrorist abuse.  Unfortunately, a strategic plan to defeat terrorist 
financing is lacking, and disrupting the financial network to identify terrorist leaders, 
networks, groups, and operational activities seems to be the current tactical focus.27  The 
United States, as well as the international community continues efforts to thwart terrorist 
financing through numerous ways since September 11, 2001.  The main players in this 
effort seem to be the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF). 
                                                 
23 Moisés Naím, "Missing Links: The New Diaspora," Foreign Policy, no. 131 (July –August 2002), 
96. 
24 Costigan and Gold, Terrornomics, 50. 
25 Ibid., 52. 
26 Ibid., 52. 
27 Ibid., 50. 
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As the lead agency in of the Department of Justice for national security and 
combating criminal activities, and empowered by Title III of the USA PATRIOT act’s 
“material support” legislation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is an important part of 
countering terrorist financing.28  It has been empowered to bridge the gap between local 
and state governments of the United States and the international community at large with 
membership in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, participation in the National Security 
Council’s Policy Coordination Committee on Terrorism Financing and The State 
Department Terror Finance Working Group.29  However, are the efforts of the FBI 
meeting a goal to eradicate funding of terrorist organizations or disrupt it just enough to 
make financing terrorism more difficult through legal forms of financial channels? 
The Financial Action Task Force is another major force in combating terrorist 
financing around the globe and ties together many governments in the international 
community.30  The Financial Action Task Force authored the Eight Special 
Recommendations (ninth added in 2004) on Terrorist Financing that all related to 
charities in one way or another.  What is important, is that one of the eight directly 
mentions abuse of Non-Governmental Organizations, and provides the first steps towards 
protecting charities from terrorist organizations based on evidence out of the Middle 
East.31 
It is imperative that a proper strategy to attain maximum protect for Islamic 
charities from abuses by terrorist organizations be created.  The large amount of funds 
generated by the zaqat, may require a more stringent and hands on regulation by the 
international community in the interest of protection from abuse.  Supported by 
investigations into Saudi charities that have revealed numerous abuses over a long period 
beginning prior to 9/11, Islamic charities are vulnerable.  Muslim diasporas also play a  
 
 
                                                 
28 Mary B. Erlande, Martin A. Weiss and United States. President, Terrorist Financing (New York: 
Nova Science Publishers, 2006), 35–36. 
29 Ibid., 39–40 
30 Ibid., 47. 
31 Ibid., 48. 
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part in controlling the charitable funds and have risen in the interest of international law 
enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Financial 
Action Task Force.   
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
It is obvious that links can exist between corrupted (or infiltrated) Islamic 
charitable organizations and terrorism.  Fawaz Damrah who used to be an Imam in 
Cleveland, Ohio stated, “Whoever donates for a mujahid so that he may throw stones is 
as if he too is fighting the Holy War, and will be rewarded like him, even if he stays 
home.  Whoever equipped a raider for the sake of God has himself raided.”32  In 2004 
According to David Aufhauser, a former Treasury Department official, “north  of [more 
than] $75 billion” has been funneled through charities to support extreme religious 
fundamentalist and terrorist groups.33  In addition, Prince Al-Waleed stated “clearly, 
there have been loose ends” in regards to terrorist groups on the take form Islamic 
charities.34  This raises a question of whether motive or ignorance comes into play of the 
givers to the Islamic charities.  Are they giving because, like most, they are truly trying to 
help a common good?  Are they ignorant to the fact that certain Islamic charities directly 
or indirectly support terrorism?  Alternatively, are they themselves knowingly supporting 
terrorism through charity? 
The zaqat, one of the 5 pillars of Islam, requires Muslims to calculate a fixed 
percentage (usually 2.5%) of their annual income and donated in support of charities, 
continuing the Muslim faith, to help those in debt, those traveling, and support the 
administration of the zaqat.35  Is it possible that the zaqat provides for an uninterrupted 
flow of funds not only to the charities, but also to terrorists?  Well meaning Muslims, as 
well as those that choose to support terrorism, are paying annually into a highly fungible 
pool of money that is hard to trace.  The “trust” placed in charities to police themselves is 
of concern because it is easily exploitable if the charitable organization is either 
                                                 
32 Alterman and Von Hippel, Understanding Islamic Charities, viii. 
33 Posner, Secrets of the Kingdom : The Inside Story of the Saudi  – U.S. Connection, 166. 
34 Ibid., 166. 
35 Alterman and Von Hippel, Understanding Islamic Charities, 16. 
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compromised, or run, by terrorists.36  What can we determine as to the effectiveness of 
domestic and/or international regulation with regard to Islamic charities and their ability 
to police themselves? 
Have terrorists found diasporas an increasingly effective source of revenues to 
collect and distribute funds throughout the world under the umbrella of charity?  The 
small communities maintain a high regard for traditional belief systems in line with their 
originating countries.  They maintain and collect the zaqat just as their fellow Muslims do 
in the Middle East, and may be exploited as well to skim or shift funds from one area to 
another.  Has this created a network of safe havens for terrorist financial activity as 
Muslims attempt to pay their zaqat only for it to be redirected using towards terrorist 
organizations? 
What is the actual purpose and sought effect of counter terrorism efforts towards 
financial networks?  Are efforts being made to eradicate all transfers and create a 
watertight system for charities to work within?  On the other hand, the motivation of 
behind efforts may actually be only to attempt restricting the flow of terrorist funds to an 
acceptable amount. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The analytical approach followed in the course of this thesis is a comparative 
study of pre and post 9/11 actions taken by the United States and the international 
community against funding terrorism through charitable organizations.  The use of case 
studies will be used in a search of how terrorist groups throughout the world such as 
Hamas and Hezbollah have received their funding through charities, and how those 
avenues have been affected by U.S. and international policies to counter terrorism 
financing.  This should allow sufficient evidence to determine if these same actions are 
also inhibiting Al-Qaeda in their abilities to abuse or misuse charities for raising funds. 
                                                 
36 Alterman and Von Hippel, Understanding Islamic Charities, 22. 
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II. ISLAMIC CHARITIES AND ZAQAT 
A. THE GOOD AND THE BAD 
Within current literature, five principal ways have surfaced that terrorists finance 
their organizations: direct contributions, international donations into charitable 
foundations, state sponsorship, criminal activities, and the collection of the zaqat.37  Of 
these five, international donations made to Islamic charitable foundations stands out as a 
primary concern for combating terrorism.  The zaqat is of secondary concern since it 
consists of a large pool of fungible resources and the majority of it finds its way into 
Islamic charities as well.  In this chapter, I will show how Islamic charities are misused, 
whether Islamic charities differ in vulnerability from other charities throughout the world 
and the importance of the zaqat. 
This is not to be mistaken as an attempt to classify all Islamic charities as 
supporting terrorism, as this is incorrect and unfounded.  Islamic charities have been just 
as effective, and at times more so, throughout the world as many other religiously 
affiliated charities.38  They provide up to one-fifth of the worlds humanitarian effort at an 
estimated $3 billion USD annually.39  An excellent example of a Muslim nonprofit that 
maintained it integrity in a rough area of the world is the Palestine Red Crescent Society. 
The Palestinian Red Crescent Society had established itself in the West Bank and 
Gaza providing emergency medical and welfare assistance to the Muslim population.40  
In an area of such strife, it could have easily become corrupt to the cause of Hamas.  The 
International Commission for the Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies stepped in to support 
the Palestinian Red Crescent Society even though it was operating separately and 
independently from the larger society itself, and was not a recognized member.  
Recognition in the International Commission for the Red Cross/Red Crescent Society 
                                                 
37 Giraldo and Trinkunas, Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, 60. 
38 Alterman and Von Hippel, Understanding Islamic Charities, 6–7. 
39 Ibid., viii. 
40 Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 213. 
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requires providing relief within sovereign states, not territories such as Palestine.41  This 
essentially established accountability for the Palestinian Red Crescent Society to a higher 
authority maintaining its established integrity and closing off its vulnerability to 
widespread corruption. 
B. DEFINING A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION 
To begin, we should examine in general what a nonprofit and/or religious 
organization is.  I have decided to use the guidelines set forth by the United States 
Internal Revenue Service as a basis for this discussion.  The Internal Revenue Service 
provides web-based guides outlining everything needed to know about the life cycle of 
these organizations, one each for nonprofit and religious organizations.  The requirements 
of these two documents are very similar (the differences between the two are not 
applicable to this discussion); they require a purpose for exemption, suggest by-laws for 
operation, filing for a employer identification number, registering with the state or states 
in which charitable collection will be made, and guidance on how you can jeopardize 
your tax exempt status.42  With the exception of the length of processing time for the 
forms to pass through the appropriate wickets within the IRS, it is relatively simple to 
establish a charitable organization in the United States. 
According to the Internal Revenue Service, “the exempt purposes set forth in 
section 501(c)(3) are charitable, religious, educational, scientific, literary, testing for 
public safety, fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and 
preventing cruelty to children or animals. 
 
Charitable is used in its generally accepted legal sense and includes relief 
of the poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged; advancement of 
religion; advancement of education or science; erecting or maintaining 
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of 
government; lessening neighborhood tensions; eliminating prejudice and 
                                                 
41  Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 212. 
42 "Tax Information for Charitable Organizations," http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/index.html 
(accessed Jul 9, 2009). 
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discrimination; defending human and civil rights secured by law; and 
combating community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.43 
 
In regards to jeopardizing the charitable organizations tax-exempt status, it is 
mostly defined by undertaking political actions such a lobbying the government.  
Interestingly enough, nowhere is it listed that financially supporting terrorism, or abuse of 
the nonprofit exemption as a front for another organization is not covered directly in the 
guides.44 
C. ZAQAT 
In order to understand Islamic charities, we must first discuss one of Islam’s main 
pillars, the zaqat.  It is an annual tax levied on Muslims as part of the Islamic faith and 
contains two parts.  First, a calculation per person within a family unit at 2.25 kilograms, 
the number calculated equates to the amount of food a household must donate.  The 
second piece more widely accepted as the zaqat itself and based on household wealth.  
Household wealth includes the value of property, income, savings, crops, livestock, gold, 
minerals, and treasures and equates to approximately $1300 USD per year.45 
 The zaqat collected supports eight types of Muslims: those with no possessions or 
livelihood, those that cannot meet basic needs, zaqat workers, converts, those escaping 
slavery, bondage or indebtedness, stranded travelers, and those with fulfilling a strong 
cause for Allah.46  Due to the nature of the reasons for the zaqat, the funds are usually 
dispersed toward regions of strife throughout the world.  This in turn, by chance, or on 
purpose, will usually end up in the hands of terrorist.47  Terrorist organizations receive 
funds for a myriad of different activities other than operational efforts of attack to include 
propaganda, recruitment, and maintaining the organizational network.48 
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The governing of the collection and distribution of the zaqat by the Islamic faith 
usually falls, in order, to the Caliphate, the Islamic Government it will be collected under, 
or the local principals such as sheikhs, sultans or Muslim clerics.49  The hierarchal nature 
of how zaqat collection will be accomplished open the door for abuses on all levels.  If 
the zaqat collection were accomplished by a Caliphate, or lower local principles, that lone 
individual alone would have the power to distribute it where he sees fit.  On average, 
twenty percent of the zaqat may support “the path of Allah” and a group included in that 
category is the mujahedeen.  Islamist Khilafah Rashidah defines “the way of Allah [as] 
spending to facilitate and enhance Jihad.  Whenever ‘Fi Sabeelilallah’ [In the Way of 
Allah] is mentioned in the Qu’ran it means nothing other than Jihad.”50  Those in position 
to handle zaqat funds are removed from any responsibility toward funding terrorism with 
the zaqat that is entrusted to them.  In Egypt, a case where zaqat was used for terrorism 
was uncovered where the Muslim Brothers maintained a source of funding for Ikhuan 
(militant/terrorist) cells from the zaqat collected from poor Egyptian neighborhoods and 
eventually were identified in assassinating Anwar Sadat.51 
In the late 1990s, it was identified through international Islamic conferences that 
the zaqat was being ineffectively used to combat poverty that Muslims throughout the 
world were suffering.52  The amount of money that the zaqat generates should easily 
show dramatic results in resolving Muslim poverty at least in local populations in relation 
to where it was collected and it was not.  Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan began 
to encourage Muslim youth to mobilize and create a zaqat fund as a catalyst for 
establishing control over and accountability of the zaqat.  Ideas also began to surface for 
coupling the zaqat to international aid organizations and calls for and international body 
for accountability purposes of the zaqat has also gained momentum.53 
 In April of 2009, a fund expected to exceed over $3 billion (USD) was announced 
as a partnership between BMB Group, a sovereign merchant bank, and the International 
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Zakat Organization charity based in Kuala Lumpur.  This fund will consolidate the 
collection of the zaqat from fifty-seven Muslim countries as well as individuals.  
Humayon Dar, chief executive officer of BMB Islamic stated that they “are also engaging 
in the highest level of due diligence and governance to ensure that the deployment of our 
funds do not advance the causes of organizations that do not promote peace and 
tolerance.”54  Being the first fund of its kind in the Muslim community, it has taken over 
10 years to accomplish a vision of monetary accountability for the zaqat. 
D. EXAMPLES OF ABUSE 
Evidence points out that one-third of all Islamic charities have, in some way, 
supported terrorist organizations.55  Some (fraudulent) Islamic charities are established 
fronts for terrorist organizations, and the majority of them have been detrimentally 
affected since 2001 as the Institution of Counter Terrorism Financing measures 
throughout the western world.  The Muslim World League, SAAR Foundation, Holy 
Land Foundation (HLF), Benevolence International Foundation/Global Relief Fund and 
Saudi High Commission are all examples of terrorist organizations falsely representing 
charitable charters to raise funds for terrorists.56  Other charities have ignorantly 
supported terrorist organizations infiltrated by terrorists who act as operatives to divert 
money away from the legitimate causes of the charity.  I will discuss the cases of 
Suleiman Abd al-Aziz al-Rajhj (SAAR), and the Holy Land Foundation as examples of 
false charities operating within the United States. 
1. Suleiman Abd al-Aziz al-Rajhj   
Started in 1984, the Suleiman Abd al-Aziz al-Rajhj (SAAR) Foundation was a 
key node in a network of “Islamic charities” throughout the United States and based in 
Herndon, Virginia.  The SAAR foundation included companies and sponsored research in 
an effort to support charities that were furthering the growth of the Islamic religion.  
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Although never proven in a court of law, the “the money trail” of this Islamic charitable 
organization’s funds ending up in the hands of terrorist organizations, such as HAMAS 
and Al-Qaida, cannot be denied.57 
In the course of my research, the connection that I have found between SAAR, 
HAMAS and Al-Qaida is as follows.  The Palestinian Islam Jihad, a terrorist 
organization, was found to be in direct communication with World and Islam Studies 
Enterprise (WISE) discussing the accomplishments of its martyrs, a U.S. federal task 
force uncovered this connection.58  WISE, in turn, received funding from another group, 
a think tank called the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT).59  IIIT then had a 
direct link to the SAAR Foundation and its associated connections to Islamic charities 
within the United States with federal tax records as proof that $26 Million (USD) had 
been unaccounted for and sent overseas to unknown recipients.60 
2. Holy Land Fund 
 
Figure 1.   Holy Land Fund Logo. 
 
The above logo was the starting point and catalyst for the work done by Rita Katz, 
author of Terrorist Hunter (published as Anonymous).  It is (was) the logo for the Holy 
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Land Fund for Relief and Development (HLF) and carries significant meaning to the 
mission of HLF.  As she inspected a piece of literature from HLF (pre-9/11), that was 
composed of an English version and Arabic version she uncovered a few interesting facts 
about this pamphlet. 
First, she noted that the hands in the picture were holding the al-Aqsa mosque 
located in Jerusalem and is the birthplace of the “the al-Aqsa intifada, and an integral 
piece of the Arab-Israeli conflict.”  As she continued, she realized that between the 
forearms was pictured a map of Palestine, with no reference to Israel and in support of 
the rally cry of Palestinians “from the river to the sea.”61  As she began to compare the 
two languages in the document, she noted that the English version mentioned 30 
charitable organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 39 in the Arabic version.  
Those nine were part of a financial network providing funds to families of HAMAS 
terrorists killed in attacks on Israelis.62  It was possible to “purchase a martyr’s son” at 
HLF conventions in the United States to help support the families of “heroes” in the eyes 
of Allah.63 
Founded in 1987, HLF was a charitable organization under the above-mentioned 
Internal Revenue Service codes for a religious charity.  Considered “America’s most 
perfectly disguised Islamic charity”; of course, the word “charity” covered an alternative 
purpose to the organization’s mission.64  From 1989 to late 2001, the Holy Land Fund for 
Relief and Development was a false front charity collecting funds for the support of 
HAMAS and other terrorist organizations operations.65 
Originally called the Occupied Land Fund, and started by Palestinian immigrants, 
HLF helped those suffering in the violence occurring between Palestinians and Israelis.  
Musa Abu Marzouk was the first major donor to the fund with $200,000 (USD), as well a 
member of HAMAS residing in the United States, and eventually became the leader of 
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the HAMAS political bureau.66  Although this is not damning in and of itself to the HLF, 
the facts will continue to demonstrate that it was a front for HAMAS in the United States. 
The next link in the chain occurred in 1993, when Ghassan Elashi, Chaiman of the 
Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) moved HLF headquarters to the IAP 
headquarters.  Elashi’s wife was also the cousin of Musa Abu Marzouk.67  Hindsight 
20/20, we see the growth of a terrorist network and financial cell “legally” in the United 
States.  One of the more interesting phrases used on fund raising commitment cards was: 
“Yes.  I can and want to help needy families of Palestinian martyrs, prisoners, and 
deportees.”68  One final piece of evidence to close the loop on the network actions 
occurred when Rahman Anati, the Jerusalem Director of HLF, was arrested for dispersing 
funds to families of Palestinian suicide bombers.  This financial network allowed terrorist 
to concentrate on their mission of terror, knowing that their families are provided for no 
matter what happened.  The connection between “purchasing a martyr’s son” for charity 
and supporting the terrorist network can easily be seen. 
3. Unique Connections 
Islamic charities connected to Saudi Arabia provide an excellent case for the need 
to focus on and protect charitable organizations from the abuse of terrorist organizations 
around the world.  Saudi charities, at a minimum, do have weak ties to terrorist 
organizations and some evidence suggests that there may stronger ties to explore.69 
There are many examples of ties other than weak ones in regards to the Saudis 
and terrorist organizations.  Up until 2003, Osama bin Laden had been allowed to collect 
millions of dollars in funds from supporters in the Kingdom although the government of 
Saudi Arabia termed him a renegade and issued a (very weakly executed) warrant for his 
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arrest.70  While allowed to operate freely in Saudi Arabia, he publicly called for 
charitable contributions toward Al-Qaida and other radical groups.71 
Although Saudi charities have been part of humanitarian efforts around the globe, 
a senate investigative commission states in 2003 that “Saudi Arabia is present at every 
stage of Al-Qaeda financing, but primarily as the major source of funding.”72  The Saudis 
up through 2003 also passed protection money onto Osama bin Laden, and charities were 
the conduit it which it occurred.73  The 9/11 Commission termed Saudi Arabia as a 
“fertile [area for] fundraising groups” and implicated extreme religious views, charitable 
giving and little legal oversight as part of the problem.74  So how has Saudi Arabia, a 
friend of the United States, become involved in directly financing terrorism?  
Wahhabism. 
A PBS Frontline analysis finds:  
For more than two centuries, Wahhabism has been Saudi Arabia's 
dominant faith.  It is an austere form of Islam that insists on a literal 
interpretation of the Koran. Strict Wahhabis believe that all those who do 
not practice their form of Islam are heathens and enemies.  Critics say that 
Wahhabism's rigidity has led it to misinterpret and distort Islam, pointing 
to extremists such as Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.  Wahhabism's 
explosive growth began in the 1970s when Saudi charities started funding 
Wahhabi schools (madrassas) and mosques from Islamabad to Culver 
City, California.75 
As we will see, we cannot discount the influence of strict religious beliefs around 
the globe, even in the most secular of societies.  It is an enabler to humans to carry out 
extraordinary acts of kindness and terror. 
Ali al-Ahmed, a Shi’s Muslim who grew up in Saudi Arabia describes for us the 
religious curriculum he grew up with on the Arabian Peninsula.  According to what he 
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experienced, there are two groups of people in the world, the Salafis (Wahhabis) Muslims 
those who are the winners and will go to heaven.  The other group is a conglomeration of 
all other people, no matter what their faith, who shall be hated, persecuted, or even killed, 
based on their status as non-believers, polytheist, or one who is not a “pure” Muslim.  
One interesting point that Ali makes in his interview, is that although Prince Nayif of 
Saudi Arabia condemned Osama bin Laden actions, they did not condemn the message he 
was sending.76  We must remember that Osama bin Laden grew up in Saudi Arabia 
within a very wealthy family and attended schools teaching the Wahhabism form of 
Islam.77  He is an example of Wahhabism’s extremist membership. 
Mai Yamani, an anthropologist in Saudi society states: 
I think that the new mood, the new trend, especially after the Gulf War, 
has become for all these neo-Wahhabis ... [is to use] Islam ... as a platform 
for political ideas and activities, using Islam to legitimize political, 
economic, social behavior.  These people have been brought up in a 
country where Islam legitimizes everything.  And they have used the 
teachings from the religious establishment, but became more political in 
expressing dissent and criticism of the regime.78 
Here in lies the unique vulnerability to Islamic charities, the Wahhabi teaching 
connects terrorism to fundamental Islamic beliefs and creates either a feeling of 
empowerment or guilt in followers, which results in donations specifically to false or 
compromised charities. 
An authority on Islamic fundamentalism, Vali Nasr, states that there is a 
connection between the fundamentalism of Islamic/Muslim terrorist groups and the 
fundamentalism of the Wahhabi. 
The connection has been growing very, very strong in the past 20 years, 
and particularly in the past ten years.  The dominant school of Islam with 
which the Taliban associate -- which is known as the Deobandi school — 
is very prominent in Afghanistan and also in wide areas of Pakistan.   
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Northern India has increasingly gravitated toward Wahhabi teaching, and 
has very, very strong organizational ties with various Wahhabi religious 
leaders.79 
The Deobandi school is located near Delhi, India, and teaches a fundamental form 
of Islam that believes Muslims have fallen away from the faith due to secularism.80 
In analyzing the information contained in the research above, I have concluded 
that the over the last 20 years, 250 years of Wahhabism teaching has created the 
capability and will for terrorist to execute actions throughout the world.81  The 
vulnerability created by the extreme views of Wahhabism allows “righteous” Muslims to 
fund terrorist networks, by any means possible, to include the abuse of charitable 
organizations.  This provides the ability to raise funds for required expenses to maintain a 
network believers committed to the cause of extremist Islam.  This network includes the 
funding and establishment of a global school system to continue the development of 
future generations of extremist individuals and an array of asymmetric weapons and 
tactics used by terrorists.  Far too long terrorists have used the cloak of charity to finance 
the operations of their organizations. 
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III. DIASPORAS AND TRIBALISM 
A. STRONG TIES 
 In this course of research, Muslim diasporas rise to the surface as an integral part 
of the overall topic of Islamic charities and the financing of terrorist organizations.  The 
traditional definition of a diaspora is associated with a group of people both forceful 
dispersed from their homeland and maintaining deeply rooted and established ties back to 
the homeland through traditions and material exchange.82  A more contemporary 
definition includes growing ethno-national groups within a nation-state due to migration 
and the availability of new and affordable communications technology.83  Muslims as an 
ethno national group are maintaining ties to their extended families and homeland 
through the use of Internet and inexpensive cellular technology.  These actions also 
further a vision among Muslims of a global ummah, or community around the globe. 
 Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should take a keen interest in 
diasporas for many reasons.  Well-organized diasporas exist throughout all of North 
America and Western Europe effectively connecting isolated ethnic populations with 
their homelands.84  This has been magnified by globalization in recent years and allows 
people to “live” in one country, while residing in another.85  Individuals maintain 
financial ties and current knowledge of their home country’s current events, politics, and 
religious teachings through electronic means which allows “real-time” updates between 
them.  The reverse has also occurred where political campaigning and fundraising has 
occurred in diasporas by candidates from the diaspora’s home country.86  Both actions 
cultivate, maintain and strengthen the diaspora. 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the role that assimilation, non-assimilation and 
tribalism can play fortifying diasporas against their host nation, and the possible rise of a 
                                                 
82 Schumann, A Muslim 'Diaspora' in the United States? 12. 
83 Ibid., 13. 
84 Garbi Schmidt, "The Transnational Umma – Myth Or Reality? Examples from the Western 
Diasporas," The Muslim World 95, no. 4 (October 2005), 578. 
85 Naím, Missing Links: The New Diaspora, 96. 
86 Ibid. 
 24
virtual extremist global Muslim diaspora on the Internet.  Eventually, this will lead to a 
globalized and organized network of Muslims that may rise and supersede the established 
nation states in unity and provide a legal framework for terrorist to operate within and 
raise required funding through large charitable donations collected throughout diasporas. 
B. THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: OPPOSITE ENDS OF THE 
SPECTRUM 
As with any story of immigration to the United States, newly arrived Americans 
eventually settled into dense communities in major cities throughout the United States.  
The Little Italies, Chinatowns and “Southies” (Boston’s Irish Catholic community) are 
still in existence today throughout the United States.  Muslim diasporas, under the more 
contemporary definition, purposely grew in the United States starting in the 1950s and 
1960s due to an influx of Muslims arriving in the United States to continue their 
education at higher levels and eventually return back to their home country.87  Their 
education plan included a short-term stay and little to no assimilation to their host 
country.  A long-term strategy to make the United States of America their new home like 
the immigrants mentioned earlier was not part of their future.  Up and until the late 70s, 
they were arriving as Muslims, and departing as higher educated Muslims back to their 
native homelands.  Islam ascended to a strong transnational religion due to this migration 
between the nation states in the Middle East and the West.88 
 As more Muslims entered the United Stated for educational purposes, it had 
become evident that they would tend to “group together” to help maintain their sense of 
their homeland community and traditions.  Muslims, arriving from numerous different 
countries, all had the same interest in maintaining habit patterns that they had learned and 
established as young adults, and not to allow themselves to change by their experience in 
the United States.  Although they continued to speak in their native languages, English 
quickly became the common language among the network of the many different Muslim 
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diasporas throughout the United States.89  Even today, young Muslim adults speak 
multiple languages and travel to the United States to take advantage of higher education, 
but in advance of their Islamic religion in a transnational way, as opposed to the 
“American Dream.”90 
As English became more commonplace, print media such as the Muslim Student 
Association News became more important than ever in maintaining the network and 
identity of Muslims in the United States.  A concerned member of the Muslim Student 
Association, Maysoon Kahf, used this medium to write a letter to  Muslim students in 
America who faced a “life-or-death-situation.”  She states: 
There are too many anti-Islam forces at work against us: valueless schools, 
material rather than spiritual rewards, TV and movie violence and sex, and 
above all, all around us is the god of America—the Human Individual—
the self-important person who makes rules according to his own judgment, 
the one who does not want to be bothered by an old parent or young 
child.91 
 In this quote, we see the conviction of those who want to remain true to their faith 
of Islam and their home of origin.  It is also obvious that a very blatant attempt is being 
made to force a choice between non-assimilation and assimilation  of the Islamic 
community to that of the geographic region they are in, in this case, the United States and 
Europe.  The quote above sounds eerily familiar to those that Osama bin Laden is now 
quite well known for.  Although the Muslim Student Association stated it did not want to 
become a political entity, it did ride a very fine line in perpetuating support for the 
struggles of Muslims abroad in places such as Palestine, Iran and other Muslim counties.  
The MSA began leveraging the geographic position of the United States for the 
advancement of the ummah across the globe while maintain the developing network of 
Muslim students in the United States.92 
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 As the 1980s began, Muslims that had planned to stay for a short time in America 
began planting roots and attitudes changed toward the host country.  They began funding 
and developing religious infrastructure such as mosques and Muslim grade schools 
alongside the growth of their marriages and children.93  Muslim institutions, paralleling 
established American institutions, began to develop within the United States to support 
the growth of the Muslim populations and insulate them from the  teachings and moral 
hazards that surround them outside their Muslim communities.94  Although this 
separation occurred, a process of assimilation began for the visiting Muslims to become 
citizens and accepting of the values, traditions, and way of life of Americans.  Immigrant 
Muslims in the United States consider themselves “American” they also identify deeply 
with their home of origin.  A transnational dimension of their lives that includes frequent 
travel to their country of origin allowing families to remain connected and an increase in 
dual citizenships supports this.95   
Muslim Americans seem to have also found a balance between the opportunities that 
the United States provides and their Muslim faith.  Comparing relative prosperity and 
education levels of a minority, in this case Muslims in the United States, to the larger part 
of the United States society it can be determined that Muslims have are assimilating 
successfully.96  Muslim American polls have shown that the majority of them fall outside 
the stereotypical cab driver role and are successfully employed in white-collar 
professional fields.97  The success that Muslim Americans garner provide buy-in to their 
host society.  In turn, this may provide an intangible first line of defense against future 
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Islamic extremist attacks against the United States because Muslim Americans may be 
(innocently) aware of plans or plots and have the ability to alert authorities.98 
 On the other hand, assimilation of European Muslims seems to have taken a more 
negative route with their host countries in comparison to American Muslims.  Host 
Countries within Europe have failed to allow individual Muslims full integration into 
their societies.99  This is a cause for concern for not only Europe, but the United States as 
well.  These concerns arise with the developing transnational persona that Islam is 
acquiring, a corresponding revival of fundamentalism by younger Muslims, and the lack 
of visa required for Europeans to travel to the United States.100 
As Islam continues to grow as a transnational religion, Muslim youth who are in their 
college years are beginning to gravitate towards fundamental Islam.  This is not to be 
confused with extremism, but we will see how one can lead to the other.  France presents 
an example of county with this issue.  Olivier Roy, a French scholar, has coined the term 
“globalized Islam” and defines it as “militant Islamic resentment at Western dominance, 
anti-imperialism exalted by revivalism.”  In France, Muslims have a long history of 
fighting for France in both World War I and II, and having a major role in helping rebuild 
France after the wars.  Unfortunately, this generation of Muslims accepted being called 
French citizens by name only and never accepted into French culture or society.101 
The younger generations of French Muslims have taken issue with this lesser form of 
citizenship that previous generations have accepted and extremism is becoming more 
prevalent among them.102  Specifically, the most dangerous generation is the second 
generation of following World War II and has fallen into adversarial assimilation or, in 
more simple terms, becoming part of the crime scene.103  This has led to the French 
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diasporas to become dissident towards the French government and isolate themselves 
from the rest of society.  A byproduct of this chemistry has created ungoverned spaces 
within the diasporas that allow “mujahedeen to fundraise, prepare and recruit for jihad” 
with the freedom these spaces provide.104  
C. EXPLOITING THE ZAQAT 
Muslims, who take their faith and zaqat seriously, began innocently supporting 
family members back in their home country with financing through their local mosques, 
hawalas, as well as through ordinary mail.105  Through the late 1980s and into the 1990s, 
a network of both individuals and organizations developed for the efficient transfer of 
funds into the Middle East and other Muslim countries from the United States.  With the 
evidence presented in chapter two of this thesis, it is easy to see that the network of 
diasporas was leveraged by terrorist organizations to carry out “system-challenging 
behavior against the United States.”106 
 Muslim population centers provide a profitable area to gather funds for the zaqat 
and Islamic charities.  Unfortunately, they also provide fertile ground for terrorist 
organizations to establish footholds in the local economy and take advantage of 
fundraising efforts and sympathetic views towards their “higher cause.”107  The majority 
of funds raised within these dense populations are usually through legal means.  
Fundraising activities within diasporas include collecting membership dues (voluntary or 
mandatory) to be a considered a member of the diaspora, donations during parties or 
celebrations, and memberships within clubs internal to the diaspora itself.108  Once again, 
with the above activities, we can see how dense ethnic populations can maintain social, 
cultural, and political connections to their country of origin.  The funds raised through the 
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above legal activities enter into; remain stored, and moved within established legal 
financial networks of the local area.  This then equates to ease of movement through the 
world’s financial network, and an opportunity for terrorist organizations takes advantage 
of their fungibility through tribalism.109  
D. TRIBALISM 
1. A Basic Look 
 As a conduit for terrorism, the basic principles of tribalism appear to fit squarely 
with the relationship between terrorist organizations and sympathetic populations in 
Muslim diasporas.  Tribalism creates the ability to expand a flat network by the 
acquisition of widely scattered, but locally organized clusters into the larger multihub 
network.110  For the purposes of this section, al Qaeda represents the established 
organization, and diasporas represent the loose Muslim fragmented clusters that are 
targeted for acquisition into the established network.  The newer clusters of the network 
can then be used, or in this case abused, for financial support after successful integration 
into the larger terrorist network that is organizing the newer pieces together.  Although it 
appears that this is a war of religious fervor, religion is just the rally cry that terrorist 
organizations are using to bring the individual tribes (diasporas) together111.  Defining 
tribalism entails understanding their reasons for organizing, and how the organization 
will run once formed and the importance of anchoring oneself to the ethnic community 
around you.112 
Tribes organize for one or more of a multitude of reasons and kinship and clans are 
the first.  Kinship is what creates the basic building blocks of the tribe as a sense of 
belonging and identity to the family unit, and the clan establishes multiple families into a 
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group for cooperative defense.113  The sense of belonging is tightly tied to the basic 
family unit where one learns to survive not as an individual, but as part of a larger whole.  
Establishing identity occurs through the extended family; both across those currently 
living in the tribe, and learning through the lineage of those that previously lived in the 
tribe.114  Our example mentioned earlier demonstrates the formation of diasporas in 
support of young Muslim students who were attempting to maintain their identity and 
protect it against the “anti-Islamic forces” in the United States.  This is due to the logic 
that Western nation states cannot support, nor understand the needs of the Muslim 
community or family.115 
Fictive kinship is also an important aspect of tribalism that is essential to our 
discussion.  Fictive kinship is based on developing a sense of brotherhood not based on 
blood relations, but on association and corporate order within the tribe such as age, 
warrior status, and spiritual enlightenment.116  It is obvious the al Qaeda uses the Muslim 
religion to establish the basic parameters for entry into its organization, and once 
acquiring a few individuals from a loose cluster, warrior status (participating in actual 
combat) and spiritual enlightenment (jihad) build and maintain the network. 
Tribes also organize around and within a specific territory in which to exploit the 
resources available to them.117  The densely ethnic populations of Muslim students grew 
around the institutions of higher learning that they chose to attend.  Just as some 
American families favor universities that previous generations attended, so too did new 
generations of Muslim students choose universities where a brother, sister or cousin may 
already be attending.  Thus, continuing an identity established by location of kin; pride in 
tribe, not alma mater.  The tribe of al Qaeda also used this logic and first favored 
ungoverned spaces throughout the world to populate, organize and train their members. 
The operational organization of a tribe is also useful in determining how, and at what 
levels a terrorist organizations can act within a Muslim diasporas around the globe.  In 
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general, tribes tend to be egalitarian, segmental, and leaderless in their organization.  
Diasporas are egalitarian since they focus first on the importance of protecting and 
maintaining the individual household first, and then the larger community.  
Fragmentation of the potential ummah along ethnic lines is unacceptable and problematic 
if the global Muslim community eventually wishes to act together with one voice and 
body.118  Muslim diasporas in the United States have successfully survived avoided 
fracture for over thirty years and have become stronger with the advent of globalization. 
Sharing throughout the community among its members establishes and maintains an 
honor in kind attitude that also strengthens the community119.  Communal suffering by a 
diaspora is an example of sharing throughout the community and non-hierarchal nature.  
When persecuted in its attempts to live by the will of Allah in a foreign land, the 
individual diaspora guides itself towards measures of resolution without the need for a 
human figurehead by sharing the burden among its members.120  This prevents division 
of the populace over which “leader” to follow.  The giving of the zaqat also falls directly 
under this paradigm of sharing and honor in the Muslim community to ease suffering by 
financially supporting those suffering persecution due to their Muslim faith. 
Although terrorist networks like al Qaeda do not overtly take over diasporas to 
become nodes in the larger network they do have an ability to tap in to this sense of 
responsibility to other Muslims and lack of leadership through the communities.  Al 
Qaeda takes advantage of this egalitarianism through the use of Osama bin Laden’s 
image of modesty and generosity as a self-effacing leader.121  He does not rant and rave 
when he speaks, he pretends to provide for a Muslim religion that is under attack, and 
suffering, giving praise for those who act out in the name of jihad to protect Islam, not in 
the name of al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. 
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With regard to segmental organization, this again applies to the family unit or 
individual acting autonomously for the betterment of the whole that in turn will create a 
continuous action of fission and fusion within the tribe.122  Looking at the diaspora, the 
closely-knit community will have its major disagreements amongst itself like any large 
family, but it is this fission that terrorist groups can act upon to create fusion to the 
terrorist network.  We must remember that these are not overt acts on the part of terrorist 
networks, but acts that are covert, and leverage the trust one Muslim has for another. 
The final organizational piece of a tribe’s operational organization is that it 
acephalous; it maintains no overall framework or structure.123  There is no hierarchal 
nature to the group because the group is in a constantly state of fission and fusion 
between families.  For one person to rise up and declare themselves a leader based on 
certain views would remove the importance of autonomy from the Muslim individual or 
household.124  Islam seeks loyalty between believers and the common practice of the 
ummah, not overbearing and oppressive leadership as can be construed of the West’s 
bureaucracies.125  Terrorist groups can exploit this characteristic by providing or 
encouraging individuals to support their cause in many ways, one of which is financially, 
on the basis of the individual Muslim’s autonomy.  Over time, those newly convinced 
individuals will eventually build more support through the ties of kinship, brotherhood or 
community already mentioned without the interference of an overarching leadership 
structure. 
Overall, it is more important to maintain the customs and codes of etiquette within a 
tribe than hierarchy, force, and law.126  In relation to the abuse of Muslim charities, 
tribalism connects the Muslim diasporas with terrorist networks through common 
religion, a religion which calls for the donation of money toward charities for the 
betterment of the Islamic community.  This essentially opens up the diaspora to abuse by 
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terrorist networks through charities based on the custom and code of Muslim charitable 
giving.  Diasporas, whether blinded with sympathy for the suffering Muslim terrorist 
organization or by ignorance of the actual theft of money through the guise of charitable 
giving are fertile ground for terrorists to raise the much-needed capital to maintain the 
overhead of their network. 
2. War and Religion 
After having made the comparison between diasporas and tribalism on a basic 
level, a more detailed look is required to understand how war and religion play into the 
dynamic.  It has already been established that tribalism maintains a family values system 
that connects not only members of a family together, but also the families that make up a 
tribe, or in this case, a diaspora.  Although diasporas are fractured from each other 
throughout the world,  the ability to network through the use of the Internet allows for a 
vision of a transnational and/or virtual ummah as possible.127  Also, within the aspects of 
tribal war, solidarity is created amongst the tribes as they fight as a whole through 
segmented warfare, differences amongst the tribe or tribes involved are put aside.128 
 This galvanizing affect of war over the tribe or tribes does not infringe on the 
ability of individuals or groups within the tribe to act autonomously in the best interest of 
the overall group.  “Classic tribal warfare emphasizes raids, ambushes, and skirmishes – 
attacks followed by withdrawals, without holding ground.”129  Looking at the broad 
aspects of the many examples that terrorists have left for us in their attacks, we can easily 
see that terrorist networks easily fit the mold of tribalism by building support through 
action in this respect. 
 Tribal religion creates an us versus them attitude that sharply divides those parties 
that decide to fight against one another.  Those entering into war over religion or on 
behalf of a higher power will target all members of the opposition’s side to include 
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women and children.130  It becomes a war of extermination, personal and emotional, as 
opposed to a war of policy occurring within the system of nation states.  Although one 
nation state may lose in a war of policy, more than like its people will survive and be 
accessed into the new order.  On the other hand, a war of religious wills continues until 
the “stronger” religion prevails and the other ceases to exist. 
 In the case of a conflict between a nation state and a tribe, one fighting a war of 
policy and the other fighting a war of religion, it will be difficult to find an end to the 
conflict.  The policy makers will continually try to appease all involved, while the tribe 
will continually try to defeat the opposing parties.  Those caught in the middle, such as 
people living within diasporas, will have to ultimately choose between tribe or state.  
Cultural differences, not racism based on biological differences, must be addressed or 
ethnic communities will unite across the globe to resist their culture from being watered 
down by the melting pot of the West.131  Inevitability, tribalism will lead Muslims away 
from the state and its policies, which they may not be comfortable with due to non-
assimilation, and toward the comfort of the tribe and the maintaining of their Muslim 
identity. 
 In the case of diasporas, this will not be obvious until a complete decoupling from 
the West’s values is achieved.  Until then, it will be very easy for the sympathetic 
members or those divided between allegiance to their host nation and their religion to 
support one with their words, and the other with their anonymous monetary gifts toward 
religious charity.  This provides and excellent opportunity for terrorist organizations to 
exploit Muslim diasporas for the funds required to maintain the war chests of terrorist 
organizations and networks.  Terrorist organizations accomplish this through abuse of 
charities by leveraging a discriminating narrative content, social appeal, and the use of 
information technology.132 
Through the narrative content of jihad, terrorist organizations are able to divide 
the world in to the ummah of Muslim brothers and sisters who have suffered insult and 
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humiliation at the hands of infidels and non-believers.133  Under this narrative, terrorist 
organizations provide an either/or dilemma for a very large part of the world’s population 
(Approximately 1.2 Billion)134.  This dilemma will be faced on a daily basis by those 
inhabiting diasporas across the globe creating an image of serving two masters (a host 
nation and a religion) with conflicting ideology and furthering a feeling of desperation for 
resolution.  Muslim youth are turning from the Islam of their parents learned in the 
diaspora and opting for a more universal transnational practice of Islam.135  With the 
Internet, they are able to “transcend their biological, cultural and social background” and 
connect to the global ummah as an individual searching for their true faith. 
The search for resolution of this dilemma will eventually lead to an analysis by the 
individual of their surroundings.  The social appeal of the jihad offers a universal 
transnational answer to allow Muslims to overcome the wrongdoing of their non-Muslim 
host nation and draws them closer to terrorist organizations.136  As previously discussed, 
the parallel institutions based on maintaining and Muslim identity created by diasporas 
will once again come into play to deepen the relationship with religion and ideology, and 
may undermine trust in host nation policy. 
 The large majority of Muslim youth use the Internet as an unquestionable 
knowledge base to learn about their religion.137  Although some may see the Internet as a 
tool to be chosen from many to communicate and learn, it is becoming essential to 
connecting displaced individuals to supporting communities.138  Terrorist organizations 
maintain an ever expanding and constant use of the Internet to exploit these searching 
souls in two major ways.  First, just as any member of any family can maintain 
connections with other family members around the globe with the Internet, so do terrorist 
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organizations.  It creates a virtual diaspora where terrorism is an accepted form of 
expression (by rebellious youth) and un-hindered by a nation states laws or policy.  It 
allows for the cultivation of ideas between current and future members of terrorist groups 
through the common ties of the Islamic religion, specifically Wahhabi (and Salafi) 
teachings.139  A quote addressing Native American tribes using the Internet 
unsuccessfully is fitting here, “But until its universalistic and individualistic foundation is 
reconstructed to incorporate spatial, social, spiritual and experiential dimensions that 
particularize its application, cyberspace is no place for tribalism.”140  Al Qaeda has 
successfully overcome the problems quoted here and it will continually create a base of 
individuals who, although are not physically engaged in terrorist acts, they will be 
convinced to financially engage through the emotional use of religion. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrated the problem of non-assimilation by Muslims in Europe 
and how the attributes of tribalism can fortify diasporas against their host nation.  These 
issues have provided a deep and fertilized ground for Muslims to root themselves in self-
segregation if allowed to continue.  Accepting the lessons that Europe is providing us on 
non-assimilation of Muslims into society is imperative because terrorism only needs a 
committed few to succeed.141  With the contradiction in success and failure of 
assimilation of Muslims within the United States and Europe respectively, the United 
States must be more vigilant to infiltration of Islamic extremists from Europe then from 
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realize that although it is important to clearly define between extremism and 
fundamentalism, tribalism can be a conduit for individuals or groups of fundamentalist to 
cross from one column to another.143 
As Islam continues to grow as a transnational religion, we must be very mindful 
of  possible spillover of discontent from European Muslims into the United States if the 
virtual ad-hoc ummah becomes and organization of tribal entities.  This may give rise to a 
virtual and extremist global Muslim diaspora with the Internet as its catalyst.  Eventually 
leading to a globalized and organized network of Muslims that may rise and supersede 
the established nation state system in unity and providing a legal framework for terrorists 
to operate within.  The ad-hoc virtual ummah that currently exists between diasporas and 
their homeland through a virtual network has helped raised required funding for terrorist 
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IV. STATE RESPONSES 
A. A STAKE IN THE GROUND 
It is an assumption that September 11, 2001, was a wakeup call for the United 
States of America and its policies on terrorism.  Up until that point, terrorist attacks had 
only been effective overseas in achieving the most effective dollar to terror ratio against 
the United States.  With the exception of Pan Am 103, most terrorist attacks from 1988-
2000 against United States citizens claimed only a small number of lives compared to 
9/11.  Although those attacks were ineffective against changing the United States’ policy 
on terrorism, they did set the U.S. up for the black eye it received on September 11, 2001.  
The terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001, convinced the United States 
government that it had terrorism under control because the attacks being experienced 
were just under the glass ceiling of unacceptable losses, and were not interfering with the 
American way of life at home. 
September 11, 2001, is a stake in the ground for changes made by the United 
States and the international community’s policies on terrorism throughout the world.  In 
this chapter I will argue that the United States possibly realized that Cold War policies of 
knowing the enemies capabilities and determining intent was now out of date, and now 
the reverse was true.  A reactionary posture towards terrorism would no longer work, and 
the United States and the international community have finally determined how to go on 
an offensive campaign to thwart terrorism before it occurs.  It is ironic that Osama bin 
Laden attacked the economic center of the world, and one of the major fronts of the war 
against terrorism targeted by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Financial 
Action Task Force is terrorist’s financing. 
 
B. BACKGROUND LEADING TO CHANGE 
For the majority of the 100 years that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
been around, they have been well known as criminal investigators, that is, after the crime 
is committed.  The focus of their job was to counter a terrorist action after its initial 
stages of execution, reacting to the incident with information gathered to attempt to 
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understand how to defuse it.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been dealing with 
terrorism since the early 1970s; the most notable examples are hijacked airliners sitting 
on airport ramps throughout the world with demands being made by those inside.144  At 
that time, the FBI maintained more of a responsive posture to incidents that occurred then 
a preventative posture. 
In 1999, a glimmer of understanding about taking offensive measures against 
terrorism occurred in the United Nations.  The United Nations established a Security 
Council Committee aptly called the “Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee” in 
accordance with UN resolution 1267.145  This committee was charged with the 
accountability of member states to implement three measures (sanctions) specifically 
against members of the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and their organizations.  The measures include 
the freezing of their assets, preventing travel of individual members, and preventing the 
ability to acquire arms.146  Although, this resolution was targeting the right crowd of 
individuals who would soon enough prove themselves, it was unfortunately too little too 
late.  The United Nations had to way of maintaining accountability of its member states 
to take the above actions.  In addition, because this resolution was so specific towards Al-
Qaida and the Taliban, it could not be enforced against those not named in the resolution. 
Again, in 2000, the United Nations “reaffirmed” its position with respect to the 
nation of Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al-Qaida with resolution 1333.  Unfortunately, no 
major changes were made in regards to countering all forms of terrorism, only reiterating 
the previous sanctions.  Of course, September 11, 2001, changed this for the United 
Nations. 
Since September 12, 2001, the United Nations changed it stance and began to 
acknowledge, “…terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most 
serious threats to peace and security, and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and 
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unjustifiable regardless of their motivations.”147  This permanently placed all forms of 
terrorism and terrorists into the criminal acts column in front of the international 
community. 
The Financial Action Task Force took its cue from the United Nations when it 
began to develop its policy towards the financing of terrorist entities and acts.  Although 
it has been around since 1989 to combat global money laundering, as of today the FATF 
has grown to 31 member states and “sets the basic framework to detect, prevent, and 
suppress the financing of terrorism and theorist acts.”148  To further motivate and support 
the Financial Action Task Force, The Paris Declaration acknowledged that financial 
crimes have become transnational in scope and looks to the FATF to fight the financing if 
terrorism internationally.149  It establishes counter-terrorist financing standards and 
maintains compliance of these standards by the international community specifically 
targeting cash couriers, alternative remittance systems and the abuse of non-profit 
organizations.150  
Events such as Pan Am 103, World Trade Center 1993, Kobar Towers 1995, 
Embassy Bombings in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000, demonstrated that remaining in a 
defensive, after the fact investigative posture would no longer work to prevent or deter 
terrorism.  These incidents also demonstrated the need for the international community to 
act as a whole to combat terrorism, as opposed to only the countries directly affected; 
terrorism was becoming everyone’s problem. 
Combating terrorism and preventing future attacks cannot rely solely on military 
means, and must include coordinated offensive front on financial networks throughout 
the world.151  The United States, as well as the international community, continues 
efforts to thwart terrorist financing through numerous ways since 9/11.  The main players 
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in this effort are the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  It must be determined whether we have truly 
moved from reactionary policies (pre-9/11) to policies of prevention (post 9/11), and has 
this shift successfully accomplished deterring terrorists from being able to effectively 
carry out another 9/11 scale plot. 
1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Today, terrorism has certainly made an evolution since the 1970s and 1980s, and 
both the FBI and the international community must evolve as well from “after the fact 
investigations” to preemptive efforts to thwart attacks before they occur.  Since its 
inception, the FBI has the investigative branch for the Department of Justice for crimes 
committed through all jurisdictions in the United States, and some criminal activates 
outside of the Unite States, directly affecting United States citizens such as Pan Am 103.  
Lockerbie, Scotland provided fertile ground for the FBI to begin its rise as the point 
agency for combating terrorism offensively for the United States.152 
In 1982, the FBI felt that an increase in hostage negotiation training and Special 
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team training, maintaining at least one hostage negotiator 
at each of the 59 field offices and a team of behavioral science specialists at the FBI 
headquarters was enough to counter terrorism at that time.153  Unfortunately, the FBI was 
looking at terrorism from the wrong side, they were preparing to end hostage situations 
without undue injury to the victims and not prevent them from occurring in the first 
place.154 
Continuing in the early 1980s the FBI also relied on computers to access their 
database and allow analysts study terrorist groups and determine if a threat was possible, 
or action was likely to occur.  This led to planning and prepositioning assets not to 
necessarily counter the threat, but to deal with it if occurred.  The FBI relied on 
deterrence through presence and accepted that preparing for an attack was more 
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important than thwarting the attack.  It was believed that as long as terrorists were not 
able to establish a “beachhead” within the continental United States that would render 
them ineffective, unfortunately globalization defeated that plan.155 
As the lead agency in the Department of Justice for national security and 
combating criminal activities and charged with the missions of counterterrorism and 
counterintelligence, and empowered by Title III of the USA PATRIOT act’s “material 
support” legislation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is an important part of 
countering terrorist financing.156  The USA PATRIOT Act allowed the FBI to explore 
and investigate the wide-ranging methods that terrorists use for financing their network of 
operatives.  The most important goal of this legislation is the ability to undermine the 
effectiveness of terrorists using financial networks, without undermining the network 
itself for legal users.  The PATRIOT Act provides the United States the ability to legally 
seize funds maintained by a foreign back that are part of a U.S. correspondent account, 
prosecute unlicensed money transmitters, and achieve faster access to transaction 
reports.157  As we will see, these abilities of the FBI are the United States’ efforts to 
implement the nine recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on terrorist 
financing. 
The FBI has been empowered to bridge the gap between local and state 
governments of the United States and the international community at large with the Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces, participation in the National Security Council’s Policy 
Coordination Committee on Terrorism Financing and The State Department Terror 
Finance Working Group.158  However, the efforts of the FBI must be measured against 
one of two goal posts in regards to terrorist financing.  It is either eradicating funding of 
terrorist organizations or disrupting the financial network enough to make it more 
difficult to funnel funds through legal forms of financial channels, or possibly both. 
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Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI charge was tracking terrorist financing 
although it did not have any operational avenues to carry out that mission in an efficient 
manner.159  After the attacks of 9/11, the FBI was funded and now able to generate 
operations specifically to counter terrorist financing called the Terrorist Financing 
Operations Section (TFOS).  The Terrorist Financing Operations Section is charged, both 
nationally and internationally, to investigate financial networks of terrorist through the 
use of public, private, and foreign information resources (intelligence), and work with 
prosecutors, and law enforcement regulatory bodies throughout the world.160 
The Terrorist Financing and Operations Section started life as part of the 
Terrorism Financial Review Group in response to the events of September 11, 2001, and 
the ensuing investigation.  Evidence concerning the events leading up to the attack on the 
World Trade Center and Washington, D.C. could be directly garnered through financial 
evidence left behind by transactions between the terrorists.  Once the investigation of the 
events of 9/11 concluded, the Terrorist Financing and Operations Section took over the 
two missions of the Terrorism Financial Review Group.  The TFOS is responsible for 
developing financial profiles of terrorist organizations and providing a template for 
preventative and predictive terrorist financial investigations.161  The TFOS has 
maintained an aggressive information campaign designed to share terrorist financing 
methods with both domestic and international law enforcement bodies, as well as 
networked with private sector financial entities.  This network provides coverage for over 
200 countries and territories across the world.162 
The TFOS accesses this network with advanced data mining computer 
programming to gather information from international bank accounts and wire transfers.  
This is then coupled to information maintained in the centralized terrorist financial 
database maintained by the TFOS and provides its partners with predictive and  
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preventative intelligence.  The terrorist financial database is a collection of individuals, 
cells, and organizations related to terrorism operating internationally and within the 
United States.163 
The FBI has successfully executed cases against corrupt Islamic charities such as 
the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, which had been linked to Hamas, 
and shut down the Benevolence International Foundation once it was found to be 
supporting Al Qaeda.164 
An excellent case involving the FBI pre and post 9/11 starts in 1995 when 
President Clinton created an executive order that effectively categorized Hamas as a 
terrorist organization.165  Unfortunately, the FBI did not have the resources, at that time, 
to freeze assets within the United States, only to track and investigate them.  The Holy 
Land Foundation had firmly established itself in the United States as an Islamic charity, 
and was growing annually in its collections.  In 1998, 1999, and 2000, the Holy Land 
Foundation raised $5 million, $6 million, and $12 million USD respectfully, within the 
United States.166  The Holy Land Foundation regularly assured U.S. authorities that 
dispersal of funds is solely based on charitable need and not ideology.167 
Then in 1997, the Israelis carried out a raid against a Holy Land Foundation 
Office in Jerusalem and found documents directly linking them to Hamas.  These 
documents were maintained to record all payments to Hamas suicide bombers, and their 
families throughout the region.168  Unfortunately, the Department of Justice hands were 
tied by the Clinton White House to take any action on the matter because the United 
States could not be seen as shutting down a charitable organization.169  The proper  
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avenues for accomplishing this had not been firmly establish domestically or 
internationally as the Financial Action Task Force was only focusing on money 
laundering at the time. 
Finally, in 2000 after an American citizen was killed in Israel, the family of that 
American took legal action and filed a lawsuit against Hamas.170  This effort of American 
citizens seemed to be the catalyst for the Clinton Administration to take action in the 
form of lobbing the Agency for International Development to stop recognizing the Holy 
Land Foundation as a charitable organization.171  This would effectively open the door to 
allow the U.S. government to investigate the now business entity for criminal connections 
without the political backlash.  Unfortunately, this process was painfully slow and 
coupled with the change in administration, the events of September 11, 2001, created an 
atmosphere within the United States that could no longer wait on this endeavor. 
After 9/11, the FBI was empowered and given the means to investigate the Holy 
Land Foundation through the North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force.172  Law 
enforcement agencies from the local, state, and federal levels joined in the effort to 
support the FBI to freeze Holy Land Foundation assets and shut down the Holy Land 
Foundation within the United States.  Terrorism was no longer something you prepare 
for, it now required effective offensive actions to combat. 
On May 27, 2009, five members of the now debunk Holy Land Foundation were 
found guilty of aiding Hamas through money laundering and tax fraud and sentenced to 
serve time in prison.  U.S. District Judge Jorge Solis sentenced Shukri Abu Baker, 
Ghassan Elashi, Mufid Abdulqader, Mohammad El-Mezain, and Abdulrahman Odeh to 
prison.  The men and Holy Land were convicted in November on 108 charges and prison 
sentences will range from 15 to 65 years.  David Kris, assistant attorney general for  
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national security stated, "These sentences should serve as a strong warning to anyone 
who knowingly provides financial support to terrorists under the guise of humanitarian 
relief."173 
Over one hundred Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) throughout the country 
are the cornerstones in the FBI’s sprawling network to counter terrorist financing 
domestically, and make the connection between the state and local governments of the 
United States and the international community through the FBI’s International Terrorism 
Financial Task Force and Fusion Centers.174  The Strategic information and Operations 
Center at the FBI headquarters is responsible for coordinating all the regional JTTFs.175 
JTTFs maintain “primary operational responsibility for terrorism investigations 
that are not related to ongoing prosecutions.”  JTTFs are operational in all 56 of the FBI’s 
field offices plus major metropolitan areas.  Their operations include surveillance source 
development, investigative activities and focus in sharing both classified and unclassified 
information with local, state, and federal government agencies.176 
 An excellent example of the effectiveness of the JTTFs occurred very recently in 
New York City.  The arrest of four terrorist suspects ended a long investigation 
accomplished by the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force culminating on 20 May 
2009.177  This demonstrates the ability of the FBI to work at the local level in support and 
alongside local law enforcement activities.  The FBI provided surveillance, inert 
explosive materials and mock “Stinger missiles” to the suspects who were planning to 
attack a local Jewish temple and center in the Bronx, New York, and military aircraft at a 
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local Air National Guard Base.178  The “home grown” terrorist were attempting jihad out 
of frustrations realized through the ringleaders father who lived in Afghanistan.179 
The above example provides evidence that globalization certainly has a play in 
magnifying local issues on the other side of the global, domestically in the United States.  
Diasporas within the United States certainly may require more attention by the FBI as 
sources of “home grown” terrorists. 
2. Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
The Financial Action Task Force is another major force in combating terrorist 
financing around the globe and ties together many governments in the international 
community to deny access to the international financial system by terrorist or their 
supporters.180  Established in 1989 to combat global money laundering, the FATF has 
grown in 2009 to 31 member states and “sets the basic framework to detect, prevent, and 
suppress the financing of terrorism and theorist acts.”181  The Paris Declaration 
acknowledged that financial crimes have become transnational in scope and looks to the 
FATF to fight the financing if terrorism internationally.182  It establishes counter-terrorist 
financing standards and maintains compliance of these standards by the international 
community specifically targeting cash couriers, alternative remittance systems and the 
abuse of non-profit organizations.183  The Financial Action Task Force authored the 
Eight Special Recommendations (ninth added in 2004) on Terrorist Financing in addition 
to the 40 recommendations previously authored on money laundering.  Member countries 
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of the Financial Action Task Force are required to implement the recommendations of the 
task force through enforcement of the country’s individual legal system.184 
The Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing are: 
1. Ratification and implementation of UN instruments 
2. Criminalizing the Financing of terrorism and associated money 
laundering 
3. Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets 
4. Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism 
5. International co-operation 
6. Alternative remittance 
7. Wire transfers 
8. Non-profit organizations 
9. Cash couriers185 
 
Recommendation 1, the ratification and implementation of UN instruments, is a 
call to action from the Financial Action Task Force to the international community to 
agree on the process of criminalizing actions related to financing terrorism across the 
globe.186  The FATF is very specific in communicating that the UN instruments to 
combat financing of terrorism should be instituted through common practices with in 
each individual nation established law.187  Article V is also a call to the international 
community for co-operative efforts against terrorism through information sharing and 
investigative efforts in pursuit of terrorists.188  
In turn, recommendation 2 is the actual call to criminalize financial acts in 
relation to terrorism throughout the international community.189  If you will, a rephrasing 
of President George W. Bush’s statement on 20 September 2001, “Either you are with us 
or you are with the terrorists.”  The FATF achieves this by basing this effort on the 
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already existing framework for prosecuting criminals under money laundering and 
strengthening it to specifically criminalize terrorist financing.190 
Immediate and future actions to be taken in reference to terrorist financing are 
addressed in recommendation 3.  The freezing of assets provides an immediate disruption 
to the financial network, followed by confiscation of the funds once they legally assessed 
and attributed to terrorist support.191  Recommendation 3 requires one of two obligations 
to be filled to “freeze and seize” funds from criminal organizations.  The first is a 
subjective and preventative one, based on reasonable grounds that a terrorist entity could 
use the funds for terrorist acts.192  The second obligation provides preventative and 
punitive courses of action based on objective criteria that directly correlates funds to 
terrorists or their actions.193  The following example demonstrates freezing and seizing 
with regards to a charitable organization that has been infiltrated by a terrorist 
organization.  The FATF encourages the country to freeze the assets of that charitable 
organization to immediately disrupt the flow of funds to terrorist action based on 
reasonable grounds or hard evidence.  When the assets are frozen, they are still the 
property of the charitable organization.  Once an investigation concludes that terrorist 
funds exist within the charity, they are seized and permanently removed from the 
charitable organization, and the frozen assets can be released back to the charity for use. 
Although they are separate recommendations, recommendations 6-9 also fall into 
the “actions to be taken” category with recommendation 3.  They include measures for 
countries (member states) to regulate, detect criminal activity, and provide criminal 
penalties for failing to follow regulations in the areas of alternate remittance, wire 
transfers, non-profit organizations, and cash couriers.194  The recommendation on cash 
couriers also provides a general catchall for future abuses of the international financial 
system. 
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Recommendation 6 has three requirements that all value transfer services, 
including formal and informal, be accountable to and insures standardization throughout 
the international financial system.  It includes licensing or registration, subjugation to the 
FATF Forty Recommendations, and the ability of the jurisdiction to impose sanctions 
against all who break the first two requirements.195 
Special Recommendation 7 requires that basic information on the origin of a wire 
transfer is maintained and immediately available if requested.196  This recommendation 
equates to requiring no more than placing a return address on a letter or postcard, but the 
information can be extremely valuable if the transfer ends up in the wrong hands.  All 
though this may drive some or all illicit transfers “underground,” it will mitigate abuse to 
many businesses, charities and the international financial system as a whole, making it 
more difficult for terrorists to move funds overall.  If it were easy to move funds 
“underground” to begin with, terrorists would have chosen that option first over the 
international financial system. 
Recommendation 8 deals directly with Non-profit Organizations that maintain 
everything a terrorist needs to move funds across the globe and maintain their operations 
network.  Non-profit organizations achieve and maintain: the trust of donors and the 
public, high dollar amounts of cash funds, outlets around the world to disperse cash to, 
and more often than not those locations are usually within areas where terrorists are likely 
to be, and receive and require little government oversight.197  
The purpose of this recommendation is obvious, that terrorist entities are not able 
to abuse non-profit organizations or charities.  Targeting three key threats to non-profit 
organizations posed by terrorist are terrorist entities setting up fronts as legitimate non-
profit organizations, creating conduits out of legitimate non-profit organizations for 
terrorist funds, and to prevent the diversion of legitimate funds for terrorist acts.198  
These areas are targeted because they are the prime areas of past abuses where action 
                                                 





needs to be taken, it also strengthens and maintains the public trust in the non-profit 
organizations.199  The Financial Action Task Force must maintain accountability of 
nations accomplishing all of this while allowing the non-profit the ability to continue 
operations and provide for those in need around the globe. 
Recommendation 9 made by the Financial Action Task Force, is over physical 
control of hand carried or shipments of currency or other negotiable instruments (i.e. pre-
paid phone cards, gift cards).  This is a difficult recommendation to implement for 
countries taking into account the endless miles of border that each country may have.  
The FATF calls nations to be able to detect cross border transportation of funds, to stop 
funds that could be sustaining terrorist operations or falsely declared, apply appropriate 
legal action, and confiscate those funds in question.200  This certainly can apply 
generically to any other type of interstate transfer of funds that the terrorist may think of 
in the future, such as abusing Internet based casino gaming. 
In addition to the above recommendations, the FATF maintains a non-cooperative 
countries and territories list in regards to those who refuse to implement measures against 
money laundering and financial support of terrorism within their borders.  This fulfills the 
call by the Paris Declaration that calls for the banning of business dealings with countries 
without such controls.201  This has forced countries to take the FATF seriously, and given 
credibility to the FATF’s ability to deter the financing of terrorism around the world. 
To continue the FATF’s efforts to maintain accountability of those countries that 
have agreed to follow the recommendations put forth, the FATF has instituted a Mutual 
Evaluations Program.  This program is a process by which all participating members are 
evaluated by the implementation and effectiveness of programs designed to follow the 
recommendations and is currently in its third evolution of evaluation.202   
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An expert team of financial, legal and law enforcement disciplines in conjunction 
with the FATF Secretariat conduct evaluations203.  This team of experts is empowered by 
the Secretariat to spend two weeks within the nation state to meet with government and 
private sector business, to maintain accountability of both.204  The FATF is fully aware 
that government oversight and involvement in the private sector can only reach so far, 
and that the private sector also has a responsibility to prevent abuses of the international 
financial system as well. 
The FATF does not leave the governments and private sector to figure it out on 
their own; they provide them with a “Handbook for Countries and Assessors” to follow 
and understand what the FATF will be evaluating.205  This handbook has four sections 
that cover everything that a nation state should expect during the evaluation and sets the 
foundation for the inspection.  The first part, a seven-section introduction, covers the 
makeup of the evaluation team to in depth instructions on completing the required 
documents for the evaluation.  The next three part, or annexes, include the “Mutual 
Evaluation/Detailed Assessment Questionnaire, Mutual Evaluation/ Detailed Assessment 
Report, and factors or elements that could be relevant to whether individual 
recommendations are effectively implemented.”206  After a thorough review of the 
AML/CFT Evaluations and Assessments, Handbook for Countries and Assessors, it is 
obvious that the FATF is not only taking into account the overall big picture of programs 
in member nations, but drilling down into the actual methods used and demonstrated by 
nations in recent actions to combat terrorist financing. 
C. CONCLUSION 
It is certainly true that September 11, 2001, was a wakeup call for the United 
States of America, as well as the international community, and their policies on terrorism.  
Up until that point, most terrorist attacks claimed only a small numbers of lives as 
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compared to 9/11 and were not significant enough to require a change in the United 
States’ policy on terrorism.  The terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001, convinced 
the United States government that it had terrorism under control because the attacks 
being experienced were just under the glass ceiling of unacceptable losses, and were not 
interfering with our way of life here at home. 
September 11, 2001, is also a stake in the ground for changes made by the United 
States and the international community’s policies on terrorism throughout the world.  The 
United States finally realized that Cold War policies of knowing the enemy’s capabilities 
and determining intent was now out of date, and now the reverse was true.  A reactionary 
posture towards terrorism would no longer work, and the United States and the 
international community finally had to determine how to go on an offensive campaign. 
Empowering these changes is Title III of the USA PATRIOT act’s “material 
support” legislation, and is an important part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
ability to countering terrorist financing.207  The most important goal of this legislation is 
the ability to undermine the effectiveness of terrorist uses of financial networks, without 
undermining the network itself for legal users.208  This ability of the FBI is the United 
States’ substantial effort to implement the nine recommendations of the Financial Action 
Task Force on terrorist financing.  The FBI demonstrated it can bridge the gap between 
local and state governments of the United States and the international community at 
large.  When measuring the efforts of the FBI, it entails either eradicating the funding of 
terrorist organizations or disrupting the financial network to make it more difficult to 
funnel funds through legal forms of financial channels.  It is concluded that it is the later 
more than the former. 
The attacks of 9/11, mandated the FBI change operationally to counter terrorist 
financing and created the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS).  The Terrorist 
Financing and Operations Section first started its life as part of the Terrorism Financial 
Review Group in response to the events of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing 
investigation.  The TFOS is responsible for developing financial profiles of terrorist 
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organizations, providing a template for preventative and predictive terrorist financial 
investigations, maintaining an aggressive information campaign designed to share 
terrorist financing methods with both domestic and international law enforcement bodies, 
as well as a networked with private sector financial entities.209  It has fulfilled its mission 
satisfactorily. 
Over the course of 100 years that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been 
around, the last eight have demonstrated a shift in how the FBI accomplishes its strategic 
mission concerning terrorism.  The FBI has made a transformation from a preventative 
posture maintained up through the late 1990s, to one of offensively thwarting terrorists 
attacks before they can gain momentum and financial support.  The case of the Holy 
Land Foundation and the thwarted plot on Jewish faith centers and a United States Air 
National Guard Base demonstrates that the FBI has become effective both at home and 
abroad. 
In the late 1990s, The United Nations was a major player in getting the 
international community to realize the international attitudes toward terrorism had to 
change, but it was not very effective in creating action toward that goal.  The 
establishment of a Security Council Committee called the “Al-Qaida and Taliban 
Sanctions Committee” in accordance with UN resolution 1267 began to highlight the 
threat of terrorism to the international community.210  Although, this resolution was a 
good, but not very effective beginning, it did form a foundation the United Nations would 
use post 9/11 to target and ramp up its programs against terrorism.  However, more 
importantly it set the stage for the Financial Action Task Force to step in and become the 
enforcer of policies throughout the world against terrorism. 
The Financial Action Task Force has proven itself as a major force in combating 
terrorist financing around the globe and ties together many governments in the 
international community to deny access to the international financial system by terrorist 
or their supporters.211  It has filled the role required of The Paris Declaration 
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acknowledging that financial crimes have become transnational in scope and the need for 
an international entity to protect the international financial system.212  The Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing coupled with the 40 recommendations 
previously authored on money laundering and complimented with the public list of non-
compliant countries has given the Financial Action Task Force the ability to enforce 
required and effective measures to fight terrorism globally.  It also provides a sound 
foundation for requirements that may develop in the future for fighting terrorism. 
Events such as Pan Am 103, World Trade Center 1993, Kobar Towers 1995, 
Embassy Bombing in 1997, and the USS Cole in 2000, demonstrated that remaining in a 
defensive, after the fact investigative posture would no longer work to prevent or deter 
terrorism.  These incidents also demonstrated the need for the international community to 
act as a whole to combat terrorism, as opposed to only the countries directly affected; 
terrorism has become everyone’s problem. 
Combating terrorism and preventing future attacks cannot rely solely on military 
means, and must include coordinated front on financial networks as demonstrated by the 
Financial Action Task Force.213  The United States, as well as the international 
community, continues effective efforts to thwart terrorist financing through numerous 
ways since 9/11.  It can be determined that we have moved from reactionary postures 
(pre-9/11) to posture of prevention (post 9/11), and this shift has successfully 
accomplished deterring terrorists from being able to effectively carry out another 9/11 
scale plot. 
It is imperative that a future policy for preventing terrorist attacks include strategy 
to attain maximum protection for Islamic charities and ethnic diasporas from abuses by 
terrorist organizations.  The large amount of funds generated in diasporas not only by the 
zaqat (Islamic charitable giving), but by membership dues paid to the diaspora itself, may 
require a more stringent and hands on regulation by the international community, 
specifically the Financial Action Task Force, and domestically within the United States 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigations. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. PUTTING THE ELEMENTS TOGETHER 
1. Understanding the Elements 
As stated earlier, applying the analogy of how fire burns to terrorism can allow us 
to understand why targeting the financing of terrorism is so important.  Fire requires three 
things to sustain itself, fuel, heat, and oxygen.  Like a fire, terrorist organizations also 
require three basic elements in the form of weapons, human capital, and funding sources 
for survival.  If the logic of the analogy holds, removing or hindering one of the elements 
should provide a degree of disruption to the terrorist organization.  In turn, this disruption 
should affect the ability of the organization carry out attacks by its operational cells.  The 
research accomplished in this effort attacks one source of funding for terrorist groups. 
Determining how creditable Islamic charities can avoid being compromised, and 
how to detect charities being used as false fronts by terrorists can establish a common 
picture to detect future abuses.  The zaqat, diasporas and tribalism all play a part in the 
common operating picture in the abuse of Islamic charities and must be understood by the 
authorities involved to take action against such abuses.  Once established, agencies such 
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and international 
agencies such as the Financial Action Task Force can develop strategies around this 
common picture to deter terrorist activities within Islamic charitable organizations and 
restrict the amount of money available to terrorist organizations.  These institutions must 
first step away from bureaucracy and understand the complexities of Islam and its role 
throughout the world. 
Knowing how terrorists use/abuse Islamic charities within a terrorist financial 
network to raise funds may allow those same legitimate charities to strengthen 
themselves and avoid accepting an unwanted business in the form of donations, hiring 
questionable employees, or providing funds to questionable sources and inhibiting one 
piece of the terrorist financial network.  The international community must take a 
supporting role, and not a directing one in these endeavors.  Once this begins to occur, 
the forces against terrorism will be seen as providing protection for the Muslim faith in 
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an indirect way and establishing credibility within the parts of the world where tribalism 
rules the inner workings of Muslim diasporas. 
The majority of research conducted uncovered a definite line between legitimate 
Islamic charities and those that are false fronts to terrorism.  Unfortunately, the average 
individual Muslim outside of war torn areas may not realize that they are providing funds 
directly to terrorist acts being accomplished around the world.  It has been found that 
tribalism could easily be manipulated amongst the dense Muslim population centers 
around the world to create a windfall of funds towards charities supporting terrorist 
actions. 
2. Fertile Grounds 
The 9/11 Commission termed Saudi Arabia as a “fertile [area for] fundraising 
groups” and implicated extreme religious views, charitable giving and little legal 
oversight as part of the problem.214  This characterization of Saudi Arabia also applies to 
the Muslim diasporas throughout the world due to non-assimilation and parallel 
institutions.  The United States has a successful record of accomplishment with 
assimilation of Muslims into society and limiting fertile grounds for extremism.  
Unfortunately, Europe remains a concern due to non-assimilation of Muslims into a 
western lifestyle.  Non-assimilation and parallel institutions go hand in hand when 
discussing why Muslims favor extremist views against a Western lifestyle.  Transnational 
education accomplished by Muslims from the Middle East in Western universities and 
colleges also allowed Islam to grow into a transnational religion.  The factors of non-
assimilation by Muslims to Western values, and the West’s non-acceptance of Islam 
created parallel Muslim institutions such as community centers, faith centers, and schools 
throughout the West to “take care of their own.”  This has maintained the ability for 
extremist groups to take advantage of outcast populations throughout the world using 
religion as the conduit. 
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Over the last 20 years, 250 years of Wahhabism teaching has created the 
capability and will for terrorists to execute actions throughout the world.215  The 
vulnerability created by the extreme views of Wahhabism allows “righteous” Muslims to 
fund terrorist networks, by any means possible, to include the abuse of charitable 
organizations.  This provides the ability to raise funds for required expenses to maintain a 
network believers of committed to the cause of extremist Islam.  This network includes 
the funding and establishment of a global school system to continue the development of 
future generations of extremist individuals and an array of asymmetric weapons and 
tactics used by terrorists.   
It is apparent that due to the effects of tribalism, it is more important to maintain 
the customs and codes of etiquette within a tribe than hierarchy, force, and law.216  In 
relation to the abuse of Muslim charities, tribalism connects the Muslim diasporas with 
terrorist networks through common religion, a religion which calls for the donation of 
money toward charities for the betterment of the Islamic community.  This essentially 
opens up the diaspora to abuse by terrorist networks through charities based on the 
custom and code of Muslim charitable giving that cannot be broken.  Diasporas, whether 
blinded with sympathy for the suffering Muslim terrorist organization or by ignorance of 
the actual theft of money through the guise of charitable giving are fertile ground for 
terrorists to raise the much-needed capital to maintain the overhead of their network. 
Non-assimilation by Muslims to their host nation and the attributes of tribalism 
can fortify diasporas against their host nation.  This creates a deep and fertilized ground 
for Muslims to root themselves into through self-segregation.  Eventually, a virtual and 
extremist global Muslim diaspora will rise with the Internet as its catalyst leading to a 
globalized and organized network of Muslims that may rise and supersede the established 
nation state system in unity and providing a legal framework for terrorists to operate 
within.  The ad-hoc virtual ummah that currently exists between diasporas and their  
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homelands through a virtual network has helped raised required funding for terrorist 
organizations and operations through the abuse of large charitable donations collected 
throughout diasporas. 
3. International Response 
As the lead agency in the Department of Justice for national security and 
combating criminal activities, and empowered by Title III of the USA PATRIOT act’s 
“material support” legislation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is an important part of 
countering terrorist financing.217  It has been empowered to bridge the gap between local 
and state governments of the United States and the international community at large with 
membership in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, participation in the National Security 
Council’s Policy Coordination Committee on Terrorism Financing and The State 
Department Terror Finance Working Group.218 
The changes empowered by Title III of the USA PATRIOT act’s “material 
support” legislation is an important part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s ability to 
countering terrorist financing.219  The most important goal of this legislation is the ability 
to undermine the effectiveness of terrorist abuses of financial networks, without 
undermining the network itself for legal users.220  The FBI demonstrated it can bridge the 
gap between local and state governments of the United States and the international 
community at large.  When measuring the efforts of the FBI, it entails either eradicating 
the funding of terrorist organizations or disrupting the financial network to make it more 
difficult to funnel funds through legal forms of financial channels.  It is concluded that it 
is the later more than the former. 
The FBI successfully changed operationally to counter terrorist financing and 
created the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS).  The TFOS is responsible for 
developing financial profiles of terrorist organizations, providing a template for 
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preventative and predictive terrorist financial investigations, maintaining an aggressive 
information campaign designed to share terrorist financing methods with both domestic 
and international law enforcement bodies, as well as a networked with private sector 
financial entities.221  It has fulfilled its mission satisfactorily. 
September 11, 2001, is also a stake in the ground for changes made by the United 
States and the international community’s policies on terrorism throughout the world.  The 
United States finally realized that Cold War policies of knowing the enemy’s capabilities 
and determining intent was now out of date, and now the reverse was true.  A reactionary 
posture towards terrorism would no longer work, and the United States and the 
international community finally had to determine how to go on an offensive campaign. 
In the late 1990s, The United Nations was a major player in getting the 
international community to realize the international attitudes toward terrorism had to 
change, but it was not very effective in creating action toward that goal.  The 
establishment of a Security Council Committee called the “Al-Qaida and Taliban 
Sanctions Committee” in accordance with UN resolution 1267 began to highlight the 
threat of terrorism to the international community.222  Although, this resolution was a 
good start, it was not a very effective beginning.  It did form the foundation the United 
Nations would use post 9/11 to target and ramp up its programs against terrorism.  
However, more importantly it set the stage for the Financial Action Task Force to step in 
and become the enforcer of policies throughout the world against financing terrorism. 
The Financial Action Task Force has proven itself as a major force in combating 
terrorist financing around the globe and ties together many governments in the 
international community to deny access to the international financial system from 
terrorist or their supporters.223  It has filled the role required of The Paris Declaration 
acknowledging that financial crimes have become transnational in scope and the need for 
an international entity to protect the international financial system.224  The Nine Special 
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Recommendations on Terrorist Financing coupled with the 40 recommendations 
previously authored on money laundering and complimented with the public list of non-
compliant countries has given the Financial Action Task Force the credibility to enforce 
required and effective measures to fight terrorism globally.  It also provides a sound 
foundation for requirements that may develop in the future for fighting terrorism. 
The Financial Action Task Force provides another major force in combating 
terrorist financing around the globe by uniting many governments within the international 
community together.225  The Financial Action Task Force authored the Eight Special 
Recommendations (ninth added in 2004) on Terrorist Financing that all related to 
charities in one way or another.  What is important, is that one of the eight directly 
mentions abuse of Non-Governmental Organizations, and provides the first steps towards 
protecting charities from terrorist organizations based on evidence out of the Middle 
East.226 
Combating terrorism and preventing future attacks cannot rely solely on military 
means, and must include coordinated front on financial networks as demonstrated by the 
Financial Action Task Force.227  The United States, as well as the international 
community, continues effective efforts to thwart terrorist financing through numerous 
ways since 9/11.  It can be determined that we have moved from reactionary postures 
(pre-9/11) to posture of prevention (post 9/11), and this shift has successfully 
accomplished deterring terrorists from being able to effectively carry out another 9/11 
scale plot. 
It is imperative that a future policy for preventing terrorist attacks include strategy 
to attain maximum protection for Islamic charities and ethnic diasporas from abuses by 
terrorist organizations.  The large amount of funds generated in diasporas not only by the 
zaqat may require a more stringent and hands on regulation by the international 
community, specifically the Financial Action Task Force, and domestically within the 
United States by the Federal Bureau of Investigations. 
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Unfortunately, a global strategic plan to defeat terrorist financing is lacking, and 
disrupting the financial network to identify terrorist leaders, networks, groups, and 
operational activities seems to be the current tactical focus.228  The all-inclusive lessons 
covered in this thesis demonstrate that there is more to this fight than physical military 
presence throughout the world by Western powers.  A global plan to fight the financial 
support of terrorism, as a global unitary effort must be achieved, as opposed to individual 
efforts by nation states, and most importantly include respected and trusted leaders from 
the Muslim community.  This will lower the number of terrorist attacks overseas, and 
continue preventing attacks on the homeland of the United States. 
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